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Abstract 
The paper examines how the Statutory Audit and Corporate Reporting Directives 
(SACORD) affect the compliance costs, risk taking and quality of financial reporting of the 
EU banks. Using a natural experiment, we find that post SACORD, both compliance costs and 
risk taking increase significantly. However, the implementation of additional regulations seems 
to be effective in terms of improved quality of financial reporting. When we analyse the impact 
by size, we find that smaller banks face disproportionately higher increase in compliance costs 
while larger banks seem to engage in greater risk taking.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of regulation for ensuring an effective financial system is extensively 
discussed in the extant literature (see e.g. Klomp & Haan, 2012). A key objective of financial 
regulation is to enhance the functioning of the financial system so that it is able to absorb shocks 
and maintain financial stability as disruptions can potentially have severe real economic effects 
(Acharya & Ryan, 2016). The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 
issued the directive 2006/43/EC (SAD) which aims to harmonise statutory audit processes 
across the European Union (EU) member states. Further, another directive 2006/46/EC (CRD) 
was issued which primarily deals with credible financial reporting. The regulations aim to 
harmonise the auditing standards and demand greater external oversight by the statutory 
auditors. The auditors are required to follow the International Auditing Standards (IAS), report 
on the appropriateness of internal controls, and verify that a corporate governance statement is 
included in the annual report. In addition, the directives require greater disclosures of Off 
Balance Sheet (OBS) and the Related Party Transactions (RPTs). These regulatory 
requirements are expected to have significant financial and investment implications for the EU 
firms. The additional scrutiny required by these regulations will need significantly more audit 
work which in turn is likely to increase the audit fee. Further, increased oversight of internal 
control systems and greater disclosures required by the regulations should lead to less risk 
taking and improved financial reporting.  
The need for effective regulation of the banking system arises because market 
participants are exposed to asymmetric information. A number of studies show that increased 
disclosures reduce information asymmetry and improve the information environment by 
providing investors equal access to information (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). However, the 
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existing literature also highlights that cost-benefit analysis of regulation is necessary to 
understand its economic consequences (e.g., LaFond & You, 2010). This paper empirically 
examines the impact of the Statutory Audit and Corporate Reporting Directives (SACORD 
hereafter) on the compliance costs, risk taking and quality of financial reporting of the EU 
banks. 
There are several important reasons why we focus our research on banks. First, the 
2007-08 financial crisis has clearly shown that banks play a central role in the financial system 
and have an unambiguous relation with systemic risk (e.g., Mohsni and Otchere, 2018). Also, 
banks are main issuers of guaranteed deposits and providers of liquidity in the economy, their 
key role in the smooth running of the financial system cannot be overemphasised. Second, 
despite their critical role in the global economy,1 previous research on the impact of disclosure 
regulations ignores banks due to their unique features (e.g., Bargeron et al., 2010; Iliev, 2010; 
De George et al., 2013). Third, the financial statements of banks are characterised by complex 
transactions and lack transparency (Flannery et al., 2013). The complexity of bank’s business 
models (e.g., Flannery et al., 2013) renders accurate pricing of  riskiness of bank assets more 
challenging (e.g., Cordella and Yeyati, 1998) which could dissuade banks from lowering risk 
taking. Finally, although SACORD regulations apply to all public listed firms in the EU, some 
of its provisions have greater implications for the banking sector. We discuss these relevant 
articles of the SACORD regulations in the next section.  
The extant literature is unanimous on the issue that regulations increase compliance 
costs. For instance, Iliev (2010) reports 74 to 87 percent increase in the compliance costs for 
1 The combined assets of the EU banks represent about half of global banking assets with branches and subsidiaries 
around the world (Lehmann & Nyberg, 2014). According to a report by the European Banking Federation (2018), 
by the end of 2017, EU-28 banks employed about 2.7 million people. Hence the impact of emerging regulations 
on the EU banks has global implications.
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the US firms following the SOX regulation. Pasiouras et al. (2009) examine the impact of 
banking regulations related with market discipline and capital requirements. They show that 
regulations which enhance market discipline increase both profit and cost efficiency of banks 
globally. However, regulations on capital requirements improves cost efficiency but reduce 
profit efficiency. Further, De George et al. (2013) find 23 percent increase in the audit costs of 
the Australian firms after the introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). Our paper contributes to this strand of literature by offering empirical evidence of the 
impact of the SACORD on compliance costs of the EU banks. 
In contrast, the evidence of the effects of regulations on risk taking is mixed. One strand 
of the literature posits that increased disclosure can reduce bank risk-taking through outside 
discipline (e.g., Bushman & Williams, 2012). For instance, Akhigbe et al. (2016) find evidence 
which suggests a decline in risk taking by banks and financial institutions following the 
introduction of the Dodd–Frank regulation. On the other hand, some studies report a positive 
association between regulation and bank risk-taking. There is evidence which suggests that 
illiquid and harder to observe nature of banks’ portfolios make it difficult for the market to 
discipline risk-taking (Flannery et al., 2013), spurring bank managers to take more risks. 
Moreno and Takalo (2016) propose a theoretical model and argue that despite the benefits of 
increased disclosures, the associated costs of regulations impose a significant financial burden 
which can influence banks to take more risks. Given the inconclusive evidence, more research 
on the impact of regulation on risk-taking is required (Acharya & Ryan, 2016). As SACORD 
is an EU-wide regulation, a thorough investigation of its effects on the risk-taking by the EU 
banks will offer rich insights to the regulators and other stakeholders.  
Another key objective of the SACORD is to improve quality of financial reporting. 
There is considerable evidence that disclosure regulations improve quality of financial 
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information (e.g., Barth et al, 2008). Barakat and Hussainey (2013) find that banks operating 
under regulations that promote competition provide higher operational risk disclosures. 
Papadamou and Tzivinikos (2013) find that adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) improves the information content of financial statements of Greek banks. 
However, there is evidence to the contrary which suggests that increased disclosure 
requirements can lead to a decline in the reporting quality as banks respond by changing assets 
composition and their classification in the financial reports (Thakor, 2015). Given the 
contradictory evidence in the extant literature, we investigate whether the SACORD 
regulations have improved the quality of financial reporting.  A robust evidence of the impact 
on the reporting quality will be highly valuable to the regulators in understanding the 
effectiveness of the regulations.  
Our paper makes novel contributions by providing evidence on the costs and benefits 
of new EU regulations that are a part of the Financial Services Actions Plan (FSAP). 
Specifically, we make three-fold contribution. First, we contribute to the literature on the 
impact of financial regulation on compliance costs (e.g., Bargeron et al., 2010; Iliev, 2010; De 
George et al., 2013). While most papers consider only non-banking firms, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to provide evidence of impact of SACORD on compliance 
costs of EU banks. Second, some studies have shown that regulation lowers bank risk taking 
(e.g., Bushman & Williams, 2012; Akhigbe et al., 2016). However, as argued by Goldstein and 
Sapra (2013), and Moreno and Takalo (2016), increased regulations which require banks to 
increase transparency can incentivise banks to take more risks. We contribute to this debate on 
disclosure regulations and its effect on bank risk taking. Third, the existing evidence on the 
impact of regulations on financial reporting quality is mixed. For instance, while Gebhardt and 
Novotny-Farkas (2011) show that IFRS improves reporting quality of banks, Callao and Jarne 
(2010) document that IFRS lowers reporting quality of non-financial firms. We make another 
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important contribution by providing fresh evidence of the impact of SACORD regulations on 
EU banks’ reporting quality.  
We employ a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation approach commonly used for 
examining the effects of changes in regulation (e.g., Altamuro & Beatty, 2010; Petacchi, 2015). 
It is important that the effects associated with SACORD are isolated. For this purpose we 
exploit the staggered implementation of SACORD for examining the impact on compliance 
costs, risk taking and the quality of financial reporting of the EU banks. For robustness, we 
follow an approach similar to the one used by Bargeron et al. (2010) and Dambra et al. (2015) 
and use the US and Canadian banks as control sample. Importantly, to mitigate the concern 
that changes in our sample composition might affect our results, we ensure that both treatment 
and control samples have at least one observation in the pre- and post-SACORD period. 
Our results offer a robust evidence of a significant impact of the SACORD regulations 
on the EU banks. We find that for EU sample only, the compliance costs increase by 11 to 13 
percent. The relative increase in the compliance costs is even greater (20 to 26 percent) when 
we use the control sample of the non-EU banks. Further, relative to the larger banks, smaller 
banks seem to be disproportionately affected by the increase in compliance costs. Next, post-
SACORD, we find a significant increase in risk-taking by the EU banks. Evidence suggests 
that the risk taking is greater for larger banks. Finally, we find that the increased disclosure 
requirements have a favourable impact on the quality of financial reporting of the EU banks.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of relevant 
literature and SACORD provisions which have implications for compliance cost, risk taking 
and financial reporting. Section 3 explains data and methods used in the study. Section 4 
presents and discusses empirical findings. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2 SACORD, LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 SACORD and EU Banks 
As mentioned earlier, while SACORD regulations apply to all publicly listed firms in 
the EU, some of the provisions have greater implications for the banking sector. For instance, 
Article 3 of the CRD amends the 4th Directive (78/660/EEC) and the Credit Institutions 
Directive (86/635/EEC) and includes a provision that requires listed banks to include a 
corporate governance statement in their annual reports. Further, the provision strengthens bank 
supervision by ensuring financial statements are prepared and published in accordance with the 
legislation (Article 50b of 78/660/EEC). Article 3 also includes provision for imposition of 
financial penalties on banks and financial institutions that infringe national provisions (Article 
60a of 78/660/EEC).2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2015, p.3) notes, 
“Effective corporate governance is critical to the proper functioning of the banking sector and 
the economy as a whole”. This suggests that sound corporate governance improves the 
financial stability of banks. Extant literature too has shown that corporate governance does 
influence quality of financial reporting and risk taking in banks (e.g., DeYoung et al., 2013; 
Moreno & Takalo, 2016).  
2.2 SACORD and compliance costs 
Many EU banks expect that increased regulation will significantly increase compliance 
costs. HSBC’s threat to relocate its headquarters to Hong Kong from the UK due to higher 
2 During the period 2008-2012, ten banks paid fine of about £150 billion for various misconducts (McCormick, 
2013).
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compliance costs is a case in point.3 The following provisions of SACORD lead us to predict 
that these will adversely affect the compliance costs of the EU banks.  
Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits (SAD) aims to harmonise the quality of audits 
in the EU, whereas Directive 2006/46/EC on corporate reporting (CRD) aims to promote 
credible financial reporting processes. The overall objectives of SAD and CRD are to improve 
corporate governance, transparency and disclosure of accounting information. These 
regulations aim to promote reliable financial reporting, improve comparability and enhance 
public confidence in the audit function.  
Article 26 of the SAD requires adoption of the International Auditing Standards (IAS) 
and article 2 of the CRD demands disclosure of Off-Balance Sheet (OBS) arrangements and 
Related Party Transactions (RPTs). Further, Article 1(7)(2) of CRD requires statutory auditors 
to verify that annual reports include a corporate governance statement by the board of directors. 
These measures aim to enhance confidence in the audit quality and the credibility of financial 
reports.4
We argue that the adoption of the IAS will significantly increase auditors’ workload 
and costs. Further, over the years, the use of OBS activities (e.g., standby letters of credit, 
guarantees, special purpose entities, etc.) in the banking sector has increased significantly 
(Mills & Newberry, 2005). Banks were not required to disclose the OBS assets and liabilities 
in the financial statements prior to the introduction of SACORD. However, post-SACORD, 
banks will be required to disclose these items in the notes to the annual accounts.  





Previous research suggests that RPTs can be used to facilitate personal gains, profit 
expropriation and fraudulent reporting (e.g., Ryngaert & Thomas, 2012). According to the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (2001), these transactions are difficult to 
identify and auditors have to rely on the management to provide information on RPTs. Lo and 
Wong (2016) show that adequate disclosure of RPTs can complement weak corporate 
governance and improve the value relevance of financial statements.  
To the extent that the statutory auditors are now required to conduct their audit in 
accordance with the IAS requirements, and carry out quality assurances on OBS and RPTs, we 
expect a significant increase in the audit fees. This argument is consistent with previous 
evidence which suggests that new regulations significantly increase compliance costs (see, for 
example, Iliev, 2010). Further, since SACORD legislation will significantly increase both the 
extent and quality of statutory audit work, auditors will charge a higher fee to compensate for 
the additional work. This will lead to a significant increase in audit costs post-SACORD. Thus 
our first null hypothesis is:  
H10: The compliance costs for the EU banks would not change post-SACORD. 
2.3 SACORD and bank risk taking 
We expect SACORD will affect risk taking because of the following two reasons. First, 
to ensure the effectiveness of the internal control systems and promote credible financial 
reporting processes, Article 41(1) of the SAD requires that the audit committee should consist 
of at least one independent director with financial expertise. Article 41(2b) requires public-
interest entities (PIEs) 5 to form an audit committee with specific responsibility to monitor the 
effectiveness of internal control, internal audit, and risk management systems.  Article 41(4) 
5 Article 2 of the CRD defines public-interest entities (PIEs) as publicly listed companies, credit institutions, 
insurance entities and any other entities designated by the member states as public-interest entities because they 
are of significant public interest. 
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requires the statutory auditor to report to the audit committee any material weaknesses in the 
internal control systems. Further, Article 1(7) of CRD entails the board to include in the annual 
financial report, a corporate governance statement that outlines the internal control and risk 
management systems. Second, greater disclosure requirements in SACORD as discussed above 
and Article 2 of the CRD regarding disclosure of OBS and RPTs will increase transparency 
and influence the risk-taking of the EU banks.  
The extant literature has found a link between audit and reporting regulations and risk 
taking. For instance, Sun and Liu (2014) examine the effects of audit committee on bank risk-
taking and report a negative association between audit committee’s effectiveness and risk. 
Danisman & Demirel (2019) provide evidence that bank regulations lower risk-taking. 
Bushman and Williams (2015) argue that publicly disclosed financial reports are a key source 
of transparency that can help in reducing risk-taking and enhancing financial stability of banks. 
Consistent with this view, Akhigbe et al. (2016) report a reduction in risk-taking by the US 
banks after the passage of the Dodd–Frank regulation.   
There is, however, a body of research which argues that more regulation can be counter-
productive as higher costs of more disclosures can result in increased risk-taking. Hyytinen and 
Takalo (2002) argue that more transparency can have detrimental effects as it imposes, not only 
direct compliance costs, but also substantial indirect costs on the banks. For example, 
information collected by a bank can be seen by competitors, thereby creating a free rider 
problem leading to reduced profitability. They argue that this worsens the moral hazard 
problem and reduces the costs of risk taking. Another argument is that bank managers’ 
incentives are linked to market prices, and the banks’ cash flows are not necessarily exogenous. 
Hence, an increase in compliance costs imposed by increased disclosure requirements can lead 
to sub-optimal behaviour and encourage managers to invest in riskier projects (Goldstein and 
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Sapra, 2013). Moreno and Takalo (2016) argue that more transparency can increase depositors’ 
uncertainty about the solvency of banks. Since banks typically finance long term assets through 
short term borrowings, this increases the probability that the creditors may not roll over the 
financing creating incentives for increased risk-taking. In a similar vein, Lundtofte and Nielsen 
(2019) find that banks increase the proportion of high risk-high earnings assets in their portfolio 
to offset higher costs imposed by stricter regulations.  
Given the competing arguments, SACORD’s effect on risk taking is not a priori obvious 
and hence our second null hypothesis is: 
H20: Risk-taking by the EU banks will not change post SACORD. 
2.4 SACORD and quality of financial reporting  
It is widely reported that greater disclosures enable investors to more effectively 
prevent managerial rent extraction, strengthen market discipline, and increase transparency of 
sensitive financial information.6 Prior literature also suggests increased disclosures are 
associated with improved financial reporting quality.7 For instance, Barth et al. (2008) analyse 
the association of International Accounting Standards (IAS) and accounting quality for 21 
countries and demonstrate that the adoption of IAS leads to higher reporting quality. Iatridis 
(2008, 2010) finds evidence of more relevant accounting quality following IFRS 
implementation for listed non-financial firms in the UK. Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) 
report a reduction in income smoothing behaviour of the European banks post-IFRS adoption. 
Further, Altamuro and Beatty (2010) find a positive association between the implementation 
of the mandated internal control provisions of the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation 
6 See Leuz and Wysocki (2016) for a survey of the disclosure literature 
7 Barth and Schipper (2008; p.173) define financial reporting quality as “the extent to which financial reports 
reveal an entity’s underlying economics in a way that is readily understandable by those using the financial 
reports.”
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Improvement Act (FDICIA) and higher reporting quality. Papadamou and Tzivinikos (2013) 
find an association between the implementation of IFRS and improvement in the reporting 
quality of Greek banks. Chan et al. (2015) show that firms increase their timely loss recognition 
after the adoption of IFRS in the EU, suggesting improved reporting quality post-IFRS.  
Although we expect the adoption of SACORD will improve the reporting quality of the 
EU banks, Goldstein and Sapra (2013) argue that improved transparency may have negative 
impact on banks because it can undermine their ability to produce private money and induce 
managers to make inefficient investment decisions, respectively. Similarly, as argued by 
Vashishtha (2014), since shareholders are concerned about costs, they may be satisfied with 
fewer disclosures so that the firm’s market value of the assets and revenue are protected from 
competitors. Further, Thakor (2015) demonstrates that banks may choose to disclose less as 
more disclosures may increase their fragility. Callao and Jarne (2010) also find evidence of 
lower reporting quality for non-financial firms post IFRS adoption. As a result, whether 
regulation improves reporting quality remains an open question. Thus our third and final null 
hypothesis is:  
H30: The quality of financial reporting will not change post SACORD. 
3. SAMPLE SELECTION, METHODS, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection   
We collect data from DataStream using annual financial statements of all listed banks 
in the EU, US and Canada from 2004 to 2013.8 The missing information is extracted from the 
annual reports from Perfect Filing database. We choose 2004 as the start date because audit fee 
8 We use listed banks because audit fees and stock return data for unlisted banks are not available.
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data are available only for a small number of the EU banks prior to that. Although our focus is 
to study the effects of the SACORD on audit costs, we also include non-audit fees since 
previous research has shown a significant positive association between audit fees and non-audit 
fees (e.g., Schmidt, 2012).  
We classify all observations from 2004 to the year before SACORD adoption as pre-
SACORD and all observations from the year of implementation to 2013 as post-SACORD (see 
Table 1 for an overview of the sample composition and year of adoption by country).9  We end 
in 2013 because as Bertrand et al. (2004) point out, using a shorter sample period around the 
event in difference-in-differences mitigates concerns about serial correlation in residuals. For 
a bank to be included in our sample, we require at least five years of data on key accounting 
variables. Further, we exclude banks which commenced their operation after 2008 and/or banks 
for which audit fees is not available. Our final sample comprises 464 listed banks, 137 banks 
(1,296 bank-years) from the EU and 327 banks (3,227 bank-years) from the US and Canada.    
>Insert Table 1 here< 
3.2 Research Methods 
3.2.1  Difference-in-differences 
We use the Difference-in-Differences (DID) analysis that is considered most effective for 
examining the unique effects of regulatory changes (e.g., Chan et al., 2015; Dambra et al., 
2015; Petacchi, 2015). The DID estimation combines the difference between the treatment and 
the control samples and pre-post comparison evaluation methodologies. It assumes that both 
samples would have followed parallel paths over time if the treatment sample is not affected 
9 Although, Norway is not a member of the EU, it has adopted the EU directive(s) in pursuance of access to the 
European’s single market. Therefore, we include Norway in our treatment sample. We exclude Cyprus, Estonia, 
Latvia, Malta and Romania because of lack of sufficient data. 
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by a specific intervention and estimates the change in outcome over time in the two samples 
(Wooldridge, 2012). A key challenge in implementing the DID involves identifying a control 
sample that is not affected by the regulation (e.g., Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). We use two 
different methods to identify the control sample for our DID specification. First, we exploit the 
different SACORD adoption dates for the countries included in our sample in Table 1 to obtain 
the differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of the regulation on costs, risk taking and 
reporting quality. The staggered implementation of the SACORD over time allows us to use 
the EU banks in the sample as both control and treatment sample. Particularly, banks in any 
country within the EU that has not adopted the directive are considered as control firms, 
whereas banks in a country that has adopted the directive are considered as treatment firms. 
For example, all banks in Italy are control banks until 2010 (see Giroud, 2013; Christensen et 
al., 2016 for similar empirical identification strategy). Thus, if SACORD is impacting the audit 
fees, any increase should be concentrated in the EU Banks post SACORD. In Table 1 we 
provide SACORD adoption dates for different countries included in the sample. 
Second, we also use a different control sample comprising the US and Canadian banks 
for ensuring robustness of our results. There is a general agreement in the extant literature that 
developed economies like the US, UK and the EU are exposed to similar underlying economics 
(Gerakos et al., 2013) and financial regulation (Coates & Srinivasan 2014). These countries 
also share similar institutional arrangements (La Porta et al., 2006), and have comparable 
capital market environments and regulations (Bargeron et al., 2010).  Previous studies on the 
U.S. market use European and Canadian firms as control sample. For example, Bargeron et al. 
(2010), Lee et al. (2014) and Dambra et al. (2015) use firms from the UK, Canada, Germany 
and France as control sample for investigating the effects of SOX, Regulation Fair Disclosure 
and the JOBS Act respectively. We follow a similar approach and use listed banks in the US 
and Canada as the control sample as these are not affected by the SACORD.  
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With an aim to ensure that the parallel trends assumption of difference-in-differences 
estimation is satisfied in the pre-treatment years spanning 2004-2007, we follow Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1985), and Barbopoulos et al. (2016) and match our sample variables by year before 
the implementation of the SACORD. We identify the matched sample through a probit 
regression using firm size (LnAssets), profitability (ROA), business risks (Nloan/TA), business 
complexity (LnAccruals/TA), income diversity (NIR/Rev), profitability (ROA), and financial 
distress (LTDebt/TA, LnSTDCFO). We use the nearest neighbour matching without 
replacement, employing a caliper distance of 0.03 to avoid bad matches. We analyse the 
differences in matching covariate balance between the EU and the non-EU banks, by following 
Focke et al. (2017) and compute the normalized differences in the pre-SACORD periods.10
Results (not tabulated here but available on request) show that our matched samples are 
similar with respect to the treatment variables in both periods on all but one variable. Further, 
the absolute value of the normalized differences (Δx) for all variables in the matched sample 
is below the 0.25 threshold, indicating that the differences in the covariates between the two 
groups are not economically significant. Thus, our treatment and control sample are similar in 
terms of the matched variables.11
A possible concern with our DID analysis is the likelihood of endogeneity of the policy 
measures, which may bias our results.  However, the formulation of the directives across the 
EU member countries to improve corporate governance and financial reporting quality 
precedes our sample period by several years. Thus, SACORD is not a consequence of the need 
to improve regulation by any particular country in response to any particular event.  It is 
unlikely that the policymakers would have anticipated the ensuing financial crisis and 
10 Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) suggest the computed normalized differences should not exceed 0.25 to 
remove specification sensitivity in the regression.
11 The results are not tabulated here but can be made available on request. 
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introduced the SACORD regulations in 2006 with effective dates from 2008. For these reasons, 
reverse causality is unlikely to be an issue our analysis (see Christensen et al. 2016 for similar 
arguments). Further, the member states also have some discretion in the implementation of 
SACORD provisions.   
3.2.2 The SACORD and the Audit costs  
For testing our first hypothesis, we estimate the following baseline DID model.12 The aim is to 
examine whether the SACORD explains the cross-sectional time series variation in changes in 
the audit fees: 
            =    +    +             + ∅          +              (1a) 
            =    +    +       ∗           + ∅          +              (1b) 
In the above linear regressions, we use equation 1(a) for the EU only sample and 
equation 1(b) is for the matched sample. We use the natural logarithm of audit fees (Auditfees) 
as a proxy for compliance costs (see De George et al., 2013; Iliev, 2010) partitioned on pre-
SACORD period (2004 to the year prior to the adoption) and post-SACORD period (year of 
adoption to 2013).     is year fixed effects, θ  is firm fixed effects, β  is the coefficient of our 
primary variable of interest which captures the interaction between the indicator for the EU 
Banks (EUR=1 if EU Bank) and the SACORD’s post-adoption period (PsSACORD=1 if post 
SACORD). If EU banks experience an increase in audit fees post-SACORD, then the 
coefficient β  that captures the differential changes in audit fees should be positive.  
          denotes a vector of control variables included to isolate the effects of the 
SACORD on the EU banks. To account for any systematic difference in the compliance costs 
12 We do not include a dummy variable for the main effect since in the firm fixed effects model, such a dummy 
would be dropped from the regressions and the fixed effects effectively converts Eq. (1) into a difference-in-
differences specification (see, for example, Dambra et al., 2015). 
17 
associated with the sample, we control for other company-specific characteristics in our model. 
Natural logarithm of total assets (LnAssets) is a control for firm size (Iliev, 2010). Loss 
indicator (Loss_Ind) is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm reports a loss for the year, 
and Return on assets (ROA) are the profitability control variables (De George et al., 2013). The 
standard deviation of cash flows from operations (LnSTDCFO) and long-term debt scaled by 
total assets (LTDebt/TA) are measures of financial distress (Chen et al., 2016a). Accruals 
(LnAccruals/TA) and number of geographic business operations (LnGeoSegmts) are control 
variables for business complexity (Iliev, 2010). Additionally, we measure bank risk using net 
loans to total assets (Nloan/TA) and nonperforming loans to total assets (NPL/TA) (Berger et 
al., 2016). We include the number of audit committee members (LnAuditCommN) as a control 
for the board’s effective oversight (Badolato et al., 2014). Tobin’s q (Tobin’s Q) is a measure 
of firm performance (Badertscher et al., 2014). We include non-interest income scaled by 
revenue (NIR/Rev) to control for income diversity and higher dependence on off-balance-sheet 
activities (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013). Following Ho et al., (2016), we control for financial crisis 
(FINCRS) via a dummy which equals one during the period 2007 to 2009, and zero for other 
non-crisis periods. We control for the effect of Basel II by way of a dummy that equals one 
from the period countries adopted the BASLE regulation13 and for the impact of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) via a dummy that equals one from 2005 for countries 
which adopted the IFRS.14
To account for country specific effects, we include the natural logarithm of real GDP 
per capita (LnGDPPerCap) obtained from World Development Indicator (WDI). We also 
13  See the appendix for details. Also see European Parliament Briefing note on US implementation of Basel II. 
Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201110/20111012ATT29102/20111012ATT29102EN.
pdf (access 17.05.2015) 
14 We do not control for types of audit firms as almost all the EU banks in our sample are audited by the BIG 4.  
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include Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom index (EconFreedm) that comprises various 
economic development indicators such as government integrity, fiscal health, monetary 
freedom, investment freedom, etc. to control for institutional factors that might affect the 
overall level of bank efficiency in a country (Barrell & Nahhas, 2019).15 All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. 
Our DID analysis is robust to firm and year fixed effects that account for any time-
invariant and cross-sectional heterogeneity in audit fees. The estimated standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity (Petersen, 2009).16
3.2.3  The SACORD regulation and risk taking 
For testing our second hypothesis, we estimate the regression model as specified in 
equation (2). We include country fixed effects to capture variation in developmental activities 
and institutional qualities that have been shown by prior literature to be associated with risk 
taking across countries over time. We include year fixed effects to control for unobserved time 
varying global shocks. The standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year to adjust for 
heteroscedasticity as well as serial- and cross-correlation (e.g., He et al., 2014).  Specifically, 
the regression model is defined as: 
        =    +    +             +    +                        (2a) 
        =    +    +       ∗           +    +            (2b) 
We use equation 2(a) in the above model for the EU only sample and equation 2(b) for the 
matched sample. RISK in equation (2) is measured using four different proxies for risk taking. 
First, we use stock return volatility estimated as the natural logarithm of the standard deviation 
15 http://www.heritage.org/index/explore
16 The results are robust to clustering standard errors by country.
19 
of daily stock returns in the fiscal year (Goetz et al., 2016). Higher volatility indicates higher 
risk taking. We exclude the bank-year observations for which we do not have stock price data 
for more than 30% in a year.
Second, following Goetz et al. (2016), we compute a Z-score for each bank that is 
considered a composite risk measure of bank stability.  




where ROA is the return on assets, CAR is the capital asset ratio and  (    ) is one year 
standard deviation of daily stock returns for each bank. The Z-score estimates the number of 
standard deviations by which profits would have to fall before a bank becomes bankrupt (Roy, 
1952).  
Third, following Laeven and Levine (2009), we use another version of the Z-score 
where the dispersion is measured as the standard deviation of return on assets.   




where ROA is the annual return on assets, CAR is annual equity capital to assets ratio of each 
bank and  (   ) is standard deviation of annual values of return on assets calculated over 3-
year overlapping periods starting from the current period t to t-2.17 Since the Z-score is highly 
skewed, we use its natural logarithm (e.g., Laeven & Levine, 2009; Houston et al. 2010). In 
our analysis, we multiply it by (-1) to ensure that a higher Z-score reflect higher risk-taking. 
Our fourth measure of risk is the Distance to Default (DD) using Merton’s (1974) 
model.18 We implement a naive approach of Bharath and Shumway (2008) because they show 
that their approach is at least as good as more complex approaches (e.g., Vassalou and Xing 
17 21 firm-year observations were less than zero and therefore these were excluded.  
18 We would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.  
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2004, Hillegeist et al., 2004). We compute the default probability (      ) for each bank as 
follows:   
       =  (−  i     ) (5) 
where 








   =  
 
   
   +  
 
   
(0.05 + 0.25 ∗   ) (7) 
and E is the market value of the bank’s equity, F is the book value of debt,       denotes the 
bank’s prior year stock returns,    is equity volatility measured as the annualised standard 
deviation of daily returns, T is the time period and set to be one year,  (.) is the cumulative 
normal distribution that converts distances to default into default probabilities, and        is 
the physical probability of default calculated over one year. A positive coefficient indicates 
higher probability of default suggesting increased bank risk-taking.  
The fifth and final measure of risk is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total assets 
ratio (NPL/TA) (Berger et al., 2016).19 A high ratio indicates greater risk-taking.  
We use deposits scaled by total assets (Deposit/TA) to control for market power 
(Marrouch & Turk-Ariss, 2014) and cash flow from operations scaled by total assets (CFO/TA) 
as proxy for cash holding (Chen et al., 2016b). Further, we include the natural log of the 
percentage of institutional shareholding (LnInst_Investor) in a firm to control for institutional 
influence on risk taking. Following Bocola et al. (2019) who argue that public debt to GDP 
ratio is an appropriate proxy to capture sovereign crisis, we include Debt/GDP to control for 
19 Non-performing loans are defined as 90+ days delinquent but not yet included in the Loan Loss Provisions.  
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European sovereign debt crisis. Other controls remain the same as in equations (1) and (2). All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
3.2.4 SACORD regulation and reporting quality  
For testing our third hypothesis regarding the SACORD’s impact on the reporting quality, we 
use two proxies: predictability of loan charge-off and predictability of cash flows (Altamuro & 
Beatty 2010; Lafond & You 2010). Specifically, we use the following OLS regression models 
(5a) and (6a) for the EU only sample, and (5b) and (6b) for the matched sample:20
 ℎ            =    +            +      /    +            ∗    /    +    /
    +       +    `               (5a) 
 ℎ            =    +            +      /    +       ∗          ∗    /    +
   /    +       +             (5b) 
and  
        =    +            +        +            ∗      +       +         (6a) 
        =    +            +        +       ∗          ∗      +       +   
                                                                                                                              (6b) 
where  ℎ            is the loan charge-offs during year t+1 scaled by year t total assets and
       is the Pre-tax income before provision for loan loss during year t+1 scaled by total 
assets of year t. Other variables are as defined in the Appendix. With respect to loan charge-
off model in equation (5), our first measure, the effect of SACORD adoption on bank reporting 
quality is measured by the coefficient (  ) on the interaction variable 
20 Results are robust when clustered at country level. 
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[EUR*]PsSACORD*LLP/TA. Existing literature (e.g., Kanagaretnam et al., 2004) shows 
banks can exploit loan loss provisions (LLP) to smooth earnings and hence they are less 
informative about next-period loan charge-offs.21 As Altamuro and Beatty (2010) note, current 
LLP will be positively related to the future charge-offs if it provides information about future 
loan defaults and will be negatively related if it is used for income smoothing. Therefore, if the 
implementation of SACORD improves bank reporting quality through its influence over the 
informativeness of LLP, we expect a positive relationship between the current LLP and future 
charge-offs.  
Regarding the predictability of cash flows model in equation (6), the coefficient on the 
[EUR*]PsSACORD*ROA is the primary variable of interest as it captures the ability of current 
earnings to predict future cash flows. Extant literature posits that accounting regulation is 
associated with greater predictability of cash flows (e.g., Altamuro & Beatty, 2010). Thus, if 
SACORD enhances reporting quality, we expect the coefficient of the interaction term (  ) to 
be positive.  
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses 
for EU banks. The mean value of audit fees is €5.9 million, with a standard deviation of €12.4 
million and the mean total audit fee is €7.1 million. The median values are considerably lower 
in both cases indicating skewness in the fees. Bank assets also show similar skewness with 
mean €187 billion and median €18 billion. Given the skewness of the fees and size distribution, 
21 Ahamed and Mallick (2017) highlights that LLP is very important in the banking literature 
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we use the natural logarithm of audit fees, total fees and the book value of assets in all our 
empirical specifications. Average bank earns a positive return on assets of 1.4 percent and 12.0 
percent of sample firm-years recorded losses. The mean (median) income diversity (NIR/REV) 
is 28.5 (27.7) percent, indicating that banks rely more on loans to generate revenue. Further, 
mean value of NPL/TA and LLP/TA is 2.7 and 5.2 percent, while the median value is 1.2 and 
0.4 percent, respectively. Given the skewness of NPL/TA and LLP/TA, we use their natural 
logarithm in our specifications. The mean (median) annual natural logarithm stock return 
volatility (LnσStkrtn) is 3.21 (3.26), and the average annual negative natural log of Z-score(rtn) 
and Z-score(roa) is 6.12 and 3.51 respectively. The mean Z-score (roa) is similar to that 
reported by Houston et al. (2010) and the range in the Z-scores reflects the cross-sectional 
variation in the level of bank risk.     
Panel B of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the matched sample for the 
regression variables. It is interesting to note that the mean audit fees (total fees) of €6.5 (€7.6) 
million before logarithm transformation for the EU banks is not statistically different from 
benchmark banks of €7.7 (€8.9) million. Further, the EU banks’ mean (median) assets of €212 
(€12.5) billion, are higher than €186 (€14.2) billion for the non-EU banks, but again, the 
difference is statistically not significant. Treatment (control) sample performance ratio 
(Tobin’s Q) is significantly higher with mean of 92.6 (90.9) percent, suggesting EU banks 
performance exceed control sample. Treatment (control) sample audit complexity 
(LnAccruals/TA) is significantly higher with mean log of -4.66 (-4.85), indicating increased 
complexity of the audit task and risk. Additionally, treatment sample mean natural logarithm 
of audit committee members (LnAuditCommN) is 1.33, relative to the control sample of 1.70 
and the difference is significant at the 1 percent level.  The average of annual log of Z-
Score(rtn) of treatment (-5.84) is significantly higher than the treatment sample (-6.21), 
indicating that EU banks appear to exhibit lower financial stability.   
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Finally, the correlation matrix (results not tabulated here but are available on request) 
shows that Audit fee is positively correlated (0.82) with firm size and with audit complexity 
(0.61). This is consistent with previously reported findings which suggest that firm size and 
audit complexity are the key determinants of audit fee.22 As correlations of none of the 
independent variables are greater than 0.6, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem.23
>Insert Table 2 here< 
4.2 The effects of SACORD on compliance costs 
Table 3 presents results of the effect of SACORD on compliance costs. The key variable 
of interest is the interaction between the dummy for the EU banks and post-SACORD adoption 
period (    ∗         ). The coefficient captures the effect on audit (or total) fees of the 
EU banks that are affected by the regulations. In column (1), we present the results of the DID 
specification for audit fees only for the EU banks. The coefficient of PsSACORD is positive 
(β=0.12) and statistically significant at the 5 percent level (t =2.13). This suggests that 
SACORD adoption significantly increased the EU banks’ audit fees by 12.6 percent.24
In column (3), we report parallel results of the effects of the SACORD on audit fees 
based on the matched sample. The coefficient on the key variable of interest remains positive 
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level (β=0.19, t=2.10). This suggests that post 
SACORD, audit fees of the EU banks increased by 20.4 percent. These results provide a strong 
22 See Hay et al. (2006) for a survey of the literature on the determinants of audit fees 
23 We calculate the variance inflation factors (unreported) and find the VIF are less than 3 for all the regressions. 
24 Kennedy (1981) suggests the appropriate transformation to get a similar interpretation for dummy variables: 
   = 100 ∗  exp  ̂ − 0.5 ∗   ( ̂)  − 1   where    is the percentage change in the dependent variable given a 
change in the dummy variable from zero to one,  ̂ is the coefficient estimate for the dummy variable, and   ( ̂)
is the OLS estimate of the variance of the coefficient. It is the transformed coefficient that is discussed in the 
text. 
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evidence of a significant increase in the compliance costs of the EU banks following the 
adoption of the SACORD.  
The results in columns (2) and (4) for the total fees are similar. Column (2) with the EU 
banks only shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 5 percent level for 
PsSACORD (β=0.10, t=2.05) suggesting that the total fees paid by the EU banks to the auditors 
increased by 10.6 percent following the implementation of the SACORD regulation. The 
results for the matched sample in column (4), show that the coefficient (EUR ∗ PsSACORD) is 
also positive and significant at the 1 percent level (β=0.23, t= 2.62). The findings imply 26 
percent increase in the fee paid by the EU banks post SACORD.  
Overall, the findings suggest that the average increase in compliance costs of the EU 
Banks without additional control sample is between 11 to 13 percent, and 20 to 26 percent 
relative to the non-EU banks post SACORD. The results in Table 3 strongly reject our null 
hypothesis H10 of no change in compliance costs post SACORD. This is consistent with the 
findings reported by previous studies. For example, Iliev (2010) reports an increase in audit 
fees of between 74 and 87 percent for firms that complied with section 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002.  In the same vein, De George et al. (2013) report an increase in audit 
costs of 23 percent following IFRS adoption in Australia.   
Finally, the explanatory power of the model is high with an adjusted R-squared of above 
77 percent in all four regressions, suggesting that the model is able to explain the cross-
sectional variation is audit fees. In addition, our results are generally consistent with regard to 
significance of the control variables (e.g., Petacchi, 2015). 25
25 Our main results are unchanged when we use the natural logarithm of revenue or market capitalization 
as a proxy for size. We also rerun our analyses by excluding observations with large increases in total assets (in 
excess of 10 percent) in the year after the SACORD implementation. Our findings reported in Table 3 remain 
robust. Results are available on request. 
26 
>Insert Table 3 here< 
4.3 Specification Tests   
We perform two additional tests. First, the implementation of the SACORD regulation 
coincides with the global financial crisis and economic recession that ensued. Consequently, 
to mitigate the possible impact of confounding events on our results, we conduct falsification 
test by rerunning the analyses with hypothetical implementation years of SACORD adoption. 
If our earlier reported results are affected by the confounding events and the implementation 
of the SACORD is not an exogenous event, then the measured effects should remain 
statistically significant when hypothetical implementation years of SACORD are used (see 
Petacchi, 2015). Further, to satisfy the parallel trend assumption of difference‐in‐differences 
tests, the coefficients of EUR ∗ PsSACORD should be insignificant in the pre-event period (e.g., 
see Li et al., 2018).  
Results reported in Table 4 show that the coefficients of  EUR ∗ PsSACORD are 
insignificant for all years except 2008.26 This suggests SACORD is an exogenous event and 
the parallel trend assumption between the treatment and the control sample underlying our 
analysis holds. The findings support the validity of the parallel trends assumption underlying 
our analysis.  
>Insert Table 4< 
4.4 The effects of SACORD on bank risk-taking  
In this section, we test our second null hypothesis H20 regarding the impact of the 
SACORD on risk-taking. In Panel A of Table 5, we present the findings on risk taking as 
26 We skipped 2009 and 2010 because of the staggered adoption by EU member countries. 
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proxied by the natural logarithm of stock return volatility (LnσStkrtn), LnZ-Score (rtn), LnZ-
Score (roa), probability of default (πnaive) and nonperforming loans (NPL/TA). The results show 
that all specifications lead to similar conclusions. Regardless of the risk proxy we use, the 
coefficient of the variable of interest (PsSACORD) is positive and statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level or better. In economic terms, when we use return volatility (LnσStkrtn) as 
a measure of risk (column 1), banks’ reported risk rises by 11 percent (=1*0.364/3.21) after the 
adoption of SACORD. Column (2) shows that the adoption of SACORD is associated with an 
increase in banks risk by 11 percent (=1*0.697/6.12) when Z-Score(rtn) is used as a measure 
of risk.27 Similarly, in column (5), the economic effect/significance of SACORD on 
nonperforming loan ratio (NPL/TA) is substantial: the regulatory policy change increases risk 
taking proxied by the ratio of nonperforming loans by 16 percent (=1*0.443/2.73).    
  Panel B of Table 5 presents parallel results for the matched sample. Except for 
LnNPL/TA, the coefficient of the key variable of interest (EUR*PsSACORD) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better for all risk proxies. The SACORD effects 
are similar to those reported in Panel A. Economically, the findings indicate that the EU banks’ 
risk taking increases by 5 percent and 12 percent respectively when Z-Score(rtn) and Z-
Score(roa) are used as risk proxies.28,29 Overall, our results strongly reject the null hypothesis 
H20 of no change in risk taking by the EU banks post SACORD. Our findings imply that the 
banks may have taken higher risks to offset the increased regulatory costs and/or increased 
transparency (Goldstein and Sapra, 2013, Moreno and Takalo, 2016). Alternatively, banks 
27 Calculated based on DeYoung and Roland (2001).
28 We also test the robustness of bank risk taking by using loan loss provision (LnLLP/TA) as a proxy (e.g., 
Williams, 2004). In Table 6, where we use it as a proxy for reporting quality, we find evidence consistent with 
the results reported in table 5.
29 As an additional robustness test, we exclude banks of some countries that were severely affected by the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) from our sample following Acharya 
et al. (2018). Our untabulated results are qualitatively similar to those in Panels A and B.
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appear to be riskier since they have had to disclose the Off-Balance Sheet transactions which 
they were not required to disclose prior to SACORD.  
>Insert Table 5 here< 
4.5 The effects of SACORD on the reporting quality 
In this section, we examine the effects of SACORD on the reporting quality of the EU banks. 
Table 6 presents the regression estimates of equations (5) and (6) using future loan charge-offs 
and cash flows with time and firm-level fixed effects. The results show that the coefficients on 
[EUR*]PsSACORD*LLP/TA are positive and significantly greater than zero (β=0.02, t=-2.04) 
and (β=0.31, t=-2.33) in columns (1) and (3) respectively. This suggests that in the post-
SACORD period, banks’ loan charge-offs became more responsive to loan loss provisions. 
Similarly, using future cash flow as dependent variable, the coefficients for the variable of 
interest ([EUR*]PsSACORD*ROA) in columns (2) and (4) are positive and significant at the 
5 percent level. The evidence demonstrates that greater transparency required by SACORD has 
led to improved bank reporting quality. The coefficients on LLP/TA in column (1) is negative 
but not significantly different from zero while in column (3), it is significantly negative which 
suggests that banks with higher loan loss provisions have lower charge offs. The results also 
show that banks with higher non-performing loans and those with lower profitability have 
higher charge offs. The findings lead us to reject our null hypothesis (H30).  
>Insert Table 6 here< 
4.6 Size effects of SACORD on the compliance costs, risk taking and reporting quality 
Finally, we examine whether the impact of SACORD is similar or different for large 
and small banks. We define a bank as large if its total assets are greater than the median value 
for all firm years. We create two dummy variables, (i) large post-SACORD, which takes the 
29 
value of one if the bank is classified as “large”, and zero otherwise; and (ii) small post-
SACORD, which takes the value of one if it is classified as “small”, and zero otherwise. To 
test whether changes in compliance costs, risk taking and reporting quality after SACORD 
differs significantly between large and small banks, we use  the Wald test.  
Panel A of Table 7 reports the p-values corresponding to the differences in the two 
coefficients on compliance costs. The difference is highly significant at the 1 per cent level for 
different specifications indicating that the compliance costs of small banks are higher than 
those of large banks in the post-SACORD period. The results are consistent with empirical 
evidence in the extant literature regarding the disproportionate impact of compliance costs for 
smaller firms (e.g., see Iliev, 2010). Panel B provides results on risk taking. The p-values from 
the Wald test assessing the significance are below 0.05 in all specifications suggesting post 
SACORD, larger banks’ risk taking increases much more than smaller banks (except in column 
3 for matched sample). Finally, Panel C shows the differences in terms of the reporting quality. 
The results indicate that though the reporting quality improves for both the small and large 
banks, there is no conclusive evidence of the differential impact on the reporting quality by 
bank size.   
>Insert Table 6 here< 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In the aftermath of the 2007-09 financial crisis, many new financial regulations were 
created and existing regulations have been revised. The extant research does not offer 
conclusive evidence of the costs and benefits of regulations and whether more regulations 
improve transparency and moderate risk taking. Excessive regulations can stifle competition 
and increase compliance costs which could reduce profits and encourage banks to take greater 
risks. The EU issued new regulations regarding the conduct of statutory audit and corporate 
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reporting standards that require greater oversight by auditors for ensuring improved corporate 
governance, internal controls and greater disclosures. The paper makes important contributions 
to the extant literature on the cost implications and effectiveness of regulation in reducing risk 
and improving quality of financial reporting including risk disclosures. We use a robust 
analytical approach including a variety of control variables and a control sample of 327 US and 
Canadian listed banks. Our results show that post SACORD, compliance costs of the EU banks 
have significantly increased. We also find that the increase in compliance costs is 
disproportionately higher for the smaller banks. 
 Next, we investigate how greater risk disclosures required by the SACORD regulations 
affect risk taking. Counterintuitively, our results indicate that post-SACORD there is a 
significant rise in risk-taking by the EU banks. Further, the increase in risk taking is greater for 
larger banks. Our results lend support to the extant literature that greater disclosures incentivise 
banks to take more risks. An alternatively explanation for our results could be that post-
SACORD the EU banks appear riskier because they are required to disclose more about their 
Off-Balance Sheet transactions.  
Finally, we examine whether the SACORD regulations improve the quality of financial 
reporting.  Our findings show that though post-SACORD, the reporting quality of the EU banks 
show improvement, we do not find conclusive evidence of the difference in the quality of 
reporting between large and small EU banks.  
We acknowledge that identifying the impact of financial regulation like the SACORD 
is empirically challenging. However, in our research design, we consider a number of factors 
and events which could affect our findings. First, we are confident that the implementation of 
the SACORD regulation was indeed an exogenous event that affected the EU banks. Second, 
our analytical approach enables us to isolate the impact of SACORD and ensures the 
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confounding events did not influence our findings. Finally, our evidence is robust to an 
alternative speciation that uses a control sample comprising the US and Canadian banks.  
Our findings have several key implications. First, financial regulation imposes 
additional costs especially on smaller EU banks. Second, increased regulation seems to 
incentivise more risk taking though this could be because of greater disclosure of riskier assets 
that previously remained Off Balance Sheet. Finally, the implementation of additional 
regulation seems to be effective in terms of improving the quality of financial reporting that 




LnAuditCommN Natural logarithm of 1 plus the size of the audit committee (from 
BoardEx). 
LnAccruals/TA The natural logarithm of the ratio of the absolute value of accruals 
(difference between net income before extraordinary items and cash flow 
from operations) scaled by ending total assets  
LnAuditfees Natural logarithm of total audit and audit-related fees charged by the 
external auditor for audit related work.   
Basel II Basel II dummy equals 1 for the EU banks from 2006, for the Canadian 
banks, from 2007, and for the US banks, from 2008. (see Aiyar, 
Calomiris, and Wieladek 2014). The EU banks adopted Basel II in 2007 
but the transition period started earlier (Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek 
2014). Since Basel II it was not adopted by all US banks and also 
difficult to identify which US banks are Basel II compliant, we assume 
that all US banks adopted Basel II in 2008.   
BizDisclos_Ind Natural log of Business extent of disclosure index from World 
Development Indicators. 
Chargeofft+1 Loan charge-offs during year t+1 scaled by total assets year t
CFO/TA Cash flow from operations scaled by total assets 
Deposit/TA Total bank deposits scaled by total assets. 
EBPt+1 Pre-tax income before provision for loan loss during year t+1 scaled by 
total assets of year t
EconFreedm Economic freedom index from the Heritage Foundation (EconFreedm)   
FINCRS Financial crisis dummy equals 1 between 2007-2009. 
LnGeoSegmts Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of geographic segments from 
DataStream. 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards dummy equals 1 when IFRS 
was implemented in EU in 2005-2013 and 2011-2013 in Canada. 
LnInst_Investor Natural logarithm of percentage of institutional shareholding. 
LLP/TA Loan loss provision scaled by total assets.  
Loss_Ind Dummy variable equal 1 if the bank reported a loss in the current year. 
LTDebt/TA  Leverage ratio, measured as the ratio of long term debts to total assets. 
NIR/Rev Non-interest-revenue scaled by total revenue. 
Nloan/TA Net loans scaled by Total assets. 
NPL/TA Nonperforming loans scaled by Total assets. 
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ROA Return on assets. Ratio of pre-tax income to assets. 
LnGDPPerCap Natural logarithm of real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.  
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank and 
Eurostat. 
LnSTDCFO Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations scaled by total assets where the standard deviation is 
calculated using the prior years t-4 to t with a minimum of three years.  
LnσStkrtn Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
measured over one year. 
LnAssets Natural logarithm of total assets measured in millions of Euros 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q is measured as: (Equity market value + Liabilities book 
value)/(Equity book value + Liabilities book value). 
LnTotalfees Natural logarithm of total audit fees, audit related fees and non-audit fees 
paid to the auditors. 
LnZ-score(roa) Natural logarithm of return-on-assets and the ratio of equity over total 
assets divided by the standard deviation  of return on assets calculated 
over 3-year overlapping periods starting from the current period t to t-2 
((Net income / Assets (book value) + Capital / Assets (book values))/ 
(Standard deviation of return on assets)   
LnZ-score(rtn) Natural logarithm of return-on-assets and the ratio of equity over total 
assets divided by the standard deviation  of daily stock market returns 
over one year ((Net income / Assets (book value) + Capital / Assets 
(book values))/ (Standard deviation of daily market returns over one 
year). 
π      Probability of default using Merton (1974). See section 3 for detail 
explanation.  
Debt/GDP Public debt scaled by gross domestic product (GDP). 
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Austria 2 20 August, 2008 
Belgium 2 20 Sept, 2008 
Bulgaria 1 9 Sept, 2008 
Czech republic 1 10 April, 2009 
Denmark 18 151 Sept, 2008 
Finland 2 20 Sept, 2008 
France 21 205 Sept, 2008 
Germany 5 50 April, 2009 
Greece 1 10 April, 2009 
Hungary 1 10 Sept, 2008 
Ireland 2 20 August, 2010 
Italy 20 193 March, 2010 
Lithuania 1 8 Sept, 2008 
Luxembourg 1 10 Sept, 2008 
Netherlands 3 29 Sept, 2008 
Norway 11 110 April, 2009 
Poland 7 70 April, 2009 
Portugal 4 36 Sept, 2008 
Slovakia 1 10 Sept, 2008 
Slovenia 1 9 Sept, 2008 
Spain 9 86 August, 2010 
Sweden 4 40 April, 2009 
United kingdom 19 171 Sept, 2008 
Control sample
Canada 9 90 N/A 
United States 318 3,137 N/A 
NOTES: The sample consists of all countries in the European Union except 
for Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Malta and Romania because of lack of sufficient 
data. We also include Norway from the European Economic Area (EEA) as 
explained in the text. The control samples are banks from the US and 
Canada.  
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TABLE 2 (PANEL A)  Summary statistics of EU banks 
Variable N Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std. Dev.
AuditFees (€’000) 1,212 222 5,885 659 4,980 12,385
TtlAuditfees (€’000) 1,212 234 7,080 875 5,950 14,724
Total Assets (€’Mill) 1,296 4,458 187,000 17,900 132,000 408,000
Loss_Ind 1,290 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.32
LnGeoSegmts 1,290 0.69 1.05 0.69 1.39 0.55
LTDebt/TA 1,290 7.49 19.44 17.32 27.66 15.42
NLoan/TA 1,290 60.72 68.88 72.11 83.26 18.50
ROA 1,255 0.80 1.39 1.24 1.68 1.96
Tobin’s Q 1,265 89.52 91.22 92.86 94.78 8.08
NIR/Rev 1,242 20.48 28.51 27.65 34.40 15.26
LnSTDCFO 1,217 -1.43 -0.78 -0.92 -0.23 0.96
LnAccruals/TA 1,290 -5.36 -4.67 -4.62 -3.94 1.27
LnAuditCommN 1,284 1.10 1.33 1.39 1.79 1.05
LnGDPPerCap 1,296 10.48 10.58 10.63 10.82 0.49
EconFreedm 1,296 1.06 1.35 1.31 1.67 0.37
Debt/GDP 1,296 41.75 65.29 63.74 85.31 28.48
LnσStkrtn 1,270 -3.61 -3.21 -3.26 -2.86 0.59
LnZ-score(rtn) 1,268 7.18 6.12 6.06 5.00 1.93
LnZ-score(roa) 1,270 4.13 3.51 3.34 2.70 1.34
NPL/TA 996 0.45 2.73 1.23 3.43 3.99
LLP/TA 1,166 0.17 5.22 0.40 1.06 48.09
CFO/TA 1,290 0.70 1.16 1.10 1.64 2.34
Deposit/TA 1,247 33.06 45.27 45.43 56.02 17.96
LnInst_Investor 1,277 0.00 2.33 2.94 3.97 1.80
       1,254 0.00 24.07 0.00 41.99 39.85
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TABLE 2 (PANEL B)  Summary statistics of treatment and control groups (matched sample) 
Treatment Control
N Q1 Mean Median Q3
Std.





AuditFees (€’000) 354 181 6,468 504 5,492 13,670 358 458 7,650 1,422 6,301 15,292 -1,182
TtlAuditfees (€’000) 354 210 7,593 553 6,479 15,849 358 458 8,876 1,470 7,751 17,431 -1,282
Total Assets (€’Mill) 366 2,826 212,000 12,500 83,000 493,000 366 2,554 186,000 14,200 133,000 389,000 26,000
Loss_Ind 366 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.32 366 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.37 -0.04*
LnGeoSegmts 366 0.69 1.08 0.69 1.39 0.55 366 0.69 0.81 0.69 0.69 0.31 0.27
LTDebt/TA 366 5.23 11.80 9.74 17.66 8.78 366 5.83 12.54 10.48 15.98 11.99 -0.74
NLoan/TA 366 53.78 64.95 67.79 80.30 18.81 366 57.73 64.25 66.96 73.65 14.30 0.70
ROA 366 0.76 1.33 1.26 1.87 1.02 366 1.07 1.34 1.44 1.94 2.57 0.01
Tobin’s Q 366 90.86 92.55 93.09 94.88 3.36 366 88.75 90.93 90.61 92.70 4.24 1.62***
Debt/GDP 366 40.20 59.38 48.50 80.82 25.98 366 62.22 79.75 81.12 98.70 18.37 -15.37***
NIR/Rev 366 0.19 0.27 0.26 0.34 0.13 366 0.14 0.26 0.27 0.36 0.15 0.01
LnSTDCFO 366 -1.39 -0.89 -0.98 -0.33 0.78 366 -1.47 -0.84 -0.92 -0.33 0.94 -0.05
LnAccruals 366 -5.25 -4.66 -4.62 -3.96 1.20 366 -5.43 -4.85 -4.66 -3.79 1.45 0.19*
LnAuditCommN 363 0.69 1.33 1.39 1.61 1.21 361 1.61 1.70 1.79 1.79 0.27 -0.37***
NPL/TA 366 0.41 1.65 0.88 2.10 1.99 366 0.35 1.82 0.97 2.33 2.38 -0.18
LnGDPPerCap 366 10.51 10.62 10.66 10.97 0.54 366 10.78 10.80 10.80 10.81 0.02 -0.17***
EconFreedm 366 1.09 1.43 1.51 1.77 0.37 366 1.40 1.48 1.50 1.59 0.13 -0.05***
LnσStkrtn 365 -3.55 -3.17 -3.24 -2.82 0.53 366 -3.11 -3.27 -2.73 0.67 365 -0.1
LnZ-score(rtn) 365 -6.84 -5.84 -5.87 -4.87 1.60 366 -7.45 -6.21 -6.43 -5.23 1.88 0.37***
LnZ-score(roa) 366 -3.82 -3.34 -3.24 -2.74 1.06 366 -4.34 -3.58 -3.43 -2.80 1.48 0.24**
NPL/TA 366 0.41 1.65 0.88 2.10 1.99 366 0.35 1.82 0.97 2.33 2.38 -0.18
LLP/TA 366 0.17 6.43 0.48 2.17 52.88 366 0.18 0.95 0.41 1.24 1.30 5.48**
CFO/TA 366 0.70 1.17 1.14 1.61 0.93 366 1.05 1.38 1.38 1.88 0.94 -0.21
Deposit/TA  366 38.89 50.11 50.79 63.06 17.64 364 60.46 66.82 68.02 74.54 11.34 -16.71***
LnInst_Investor 364 0.00 2.47 2.94 4.06 1.74 363 0.00 2.11 2.48 3.22 1.42 0.36***
       364 0.00 23.00 0.00 30.19 39.48 366 0.00 14.52 0.00 0.00 0.05 8.49***
NOTES: Table 2, Panel A reports the summary statistics of EU only banks. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for our matched sample. Test statistics are computed using 
a t-test (two-tailed test) for a significant change in means, statistically significance denoted as ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, assuming independence.
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TABLE 3 The effect of SACORD on compliance costs  
EU banks only Matched Sample
LnAuditfees LnTotalfees LnAuditfees LnTotalfees 
Columns  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
[EUR*]PsSACORD 0.120** 2.13 0.102** 2.05 0.190** 2.10 0.233*** 2.62 
IFRS 0.083 1.11 0.035 0.49 0.047 0.68 0.050 0.75 
FINCRS 0.069** 2.26 0.079*** 2.62 0.082** 2.20 0.061* 1.77 
Basel II 0.116** 2.05 0.079 1.36 0.020 0.37 -0.026 -0.54 
LnGeoSegmts 0.206 1.61 0.280** 2.41 0.454*** 3.78 0.518*** 4.17 
Loss_Ind 0.059 0.90 0.059 0.90 0.003 0.05 0.020 0.34 
LnAssets 0.503*** 4.25 0.655*** 5.84 0.537*** 5.51 0.507*** 4.99 
LTDebt/TA 0.001 0.22 -0.001 -0.36 -0.006 -1.55 -0.005 -1.34 
NLoan/TA 0.003 0.98 0.005 1.43 0.007* 1.96 0.007** 2.16 
LnGDPPerCap -0.546 -0.71 -0.509 -0.67 1.138 1.19 1.247 1.30 
EcoFreedm 0.002 0.19 0.003 0.27 -0.013 -1.23 -0.011 -0.97 
Tobin’s Q 0.038* 1.73 0.041* 1.81 0.017 1.01 0.020 1.18 
ROA 0.051* 1.64 0.076** 2.55 -0.013 -0.44 0.000 -0.01 
LnSTDCFO 0.010 0.31 0.014 0.39 -0.001 -0.02 -0.011 -0.32 
NPL/TA 0.003 0.30 0.008 0.84 0.063*** 3.18 0.062*** 3.14 
NIR/Rev 0.557** 2.08 0.590** 2.27 1.029*** 2.82 0.953*** 2.70 
LnAuditCommN 0.116** 2.26 0.082** 2.18 0.003 0.05 0.002 0.04 
LnAccruals/TA 0.008 0.73 0.002 0.15 -0.005 -0.44 -0.009 -0.81 
Intercept -0.529 -0.06 -3.864 -0.47 -15.958 -1.61 -17.073* -1.70 
Impact (%) 12.60 10.62 20.41 25.73 
Number of observations 921 921 706 706 
Adj. R-squared (%) 77.41 80.22 78.92 78.45 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
NOTES:   This table presents the effect of SACORD on audit fees and total fees. The dependent variables are 
the Natural logarithm of audit fees and total Fees. In estimating (1) to (4), EUR*PsSACORD is an interaction 
dummy variable equals to one if the bank is EU and the period is from the adoption year to 2013. We include 
year and firm fixed effects to control for any fundamental differences in the fees across years and firms. 
Implied fee increase refers to the effect of implementing SACORD regulation on mean banks in EU in € 
thousands. Matched sample analysis is based on size (LnAssets), profitability (ROA), financial distress 
(LnSTDCFO, LTDebt/TA), business complexity (LnAccruals/TA), income diversity (NIR/Rev) and business 
risk (Nloans/TA, NPL/TA). All other firm characteristics are as defined in the Appendix. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Country and year fixed effects are included in each 
regression but not reported. The models are estimated by difference-in-differences with standard errors that are 
robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance denoted as ***, **, and * for 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively (using a two-sided test).  
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TABLE 4 Falsification tests for the effect of the SACORD on compliance costs
Full Sample Matched Sample EU banks only
LnAuditfees LnTotalfees LnAuditfees LnTotalfees LnAuditfees LnTotalfees 
(EUR*)PsSACORD[2006] 0.074 0.031 0.182* 0.097 0.174 0.136 
[0.89] [0.40] [1.84] [0.78] [1.08] [0.91] 
(EUR*)PsSACORD[2007] 0.029 0.035 -0.034 0.070 0.066 0.072 
[0.39] [0.46] [-0.33] [0.58] [0.47] [0.55] 
(EUR*)PsSACORD[2008] 0.253*** 0.272*** 0.190** 0.233*** 0.120** 0.102** 
[4.26] [4.17] [2.10] [2.61] [2.13] [2.05] 
(EUR*)PsSACORD[2011] -0.014 0.001 0.0145 0.004 0.098* 0.081 
[-0.45] [0.02] [0.39] [0.11] [1.77] [1.61] 
(EUR*)PsSACORD[2012] -0.012 -0.024 0.038 -0.037 0.048 0.035 
[-0.32] [-0.61] [-1.20] [-1.12] [1.27] [0.99] 
Observation 1164 1164 706 706 921 921 
Adj. R-squared (%) 77.12 81.22 80.23 84.24 77.36 80.12 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NOTES:  This table presents the results from regressing audit fees and total fees on indicator 
variables for two years following the implementation of the regulation. The regressions include (but 
are not reported here) a constant term and control variables used in model 1 (not reported here for 
brevity), and are estimated by difference-in-differences with standard errors that are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The explanatory variables are defined as follows: 
(EUR*)PsSACORD[2006] is an indicator variable that equals one for 2006 financial yearend and 
subsequent years; (EUR*)PsSACORD[2007] is an indicator variable that equals one for 2007 
financial yearend and subsequent years; (EUR*)PsSACORD[2008] is an indicator variable that 
equals one for 2008 financial yearend and subsequent years; (EUR*)PsSACORD[2011] is an 
indicator variable that equals one for 2011 financial yearend and the following years; and 
(EUR*)PsSACORD[2012] is an indicator variable that equals one for 2012 financial yearend and 
the following years.  Matched sample analysis is based on Fiscal Year, size (LnAssets), profitability 
(ROA), financial distress (LnSTDCFO), and business risk (Nloans/TA). All other firm 
characteristics are as defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentile. Statistical significance denoted as ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
(using a two-sided test). 
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TABLE 5 (PANEL A)  The effect of SACORD on risk taking (EU banks only)
LnσStkrtn LnZ-score(rtn) LnZ-score(roa)        LnNPL/TA 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
PsSACORD 0.362*** 5.18 0.697*** 4.60 0.223*** 3.56 0.318*** 3.15 0.443** 2.05 
IFRS 0.035* 1.64 0.042 0.96 -0.036 -0.83 -0.004 -0.24 0.061 0.31 
FINCRS 0.405*** 5.06 0.809*** 4.95 0.303*** 4.47 0.239* 1.66 -0.095 -0.89 
Basel II 0.145** 2.46 0.266** 2.23 -0.091* -1.84 0.016 0.23 0.399** 2.40 
LnGeoSegmts 0.089 1.60 0.246** 2.06 0.053 0.48 -0.019 -0.71 0.110 1.22 
Loss_Ind 0.480*** 6.74 1.221*** 7.35 0.823*** 5.50 0.243*** 4.94 0.712*** 4.72 
LnAssets -0.029 -1.35 -0.056 -1.31 -0.080** -2.37 0.002 0.12 0.040 0.86 
LTDebt/TA -0.001 -0.64 -0.006 -1.22 -0.004 -0.89 0.001 1.23 -0.011 -1.56 
NLoan/TA -0.003** -2.47 -0.014*** -4.35 -0.014*** -4.09 0.000 -0.27 0.001 0.12 
LnGDPPerCap -1.835** -2.47 -3.851*** -2.88 -1.910** -2.06 -1.718 -1.36 -1.958 -1.54 
EconFreedm 0.010 0.92 0.041 1.49 -0.007 -0.20 -0.006 -0.31 -0.082*** -3.25 
Tobin’s Q 0.016*** 2.80 0.217*** 10.79 0.073*** 4.54 0.015*** 3.53 0.079*** 3.39 
LnSTDCFO 0.020 0.82 0.042 0.73 0.200*** 2.92 0.003 0.31 0.043 0.90 
CFO/TA 0.000 -0.04 -0.037 -1.33 0.027 0.98 0.010* 1.85 0.086* 1.90 
NIR/Rev 0.230 1.32 0.343 0.94 -0.684 -1.45 -0.014 -0.11 0.447 0.84 
LnAuditCommN -0.016 -0.70 -0.061 -1.21 -0.073 -1.57 -0.005 -0.53 -0.029 -0.65 
LnAccruals/TA 0.007 0.56 0.017 0.83 0.013 0.31 0.005 0.51 0.065* 1.73 
Deposit/TA -0.002 -1.14 -0.008 -1.28 -0.005 -1.34 -0.003** -2.11 0.033*** 5.27 
LnInst_Investor -0.006 -0.51 0.006 0.24 0.025 1.04 -0.008 -1.31 0.064** 2.29 
Debt/GDP -0.000 -0.33 -0.002 -0.97 0.001 0.98 -0.000 -0.09 -0.006 -1.52 
Intercept 14.278* 1.91 13.281 0.96 13.226 1.38 0.319*** 3.26 16.283 1.23 
No of observations 1148 1148 1144 1140 951 
Adj. R-squared (%) 61.96 78.60 43.96 40.47 73.85 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table shows the regression results for the risk taking behaviour of banks post-SACORD. The dependent 
variables are the log value of bank Z-score(rtn) from Goetz et al. (2016); natural log value of bank Z-score(roa) from 
Laeven and Levine (2009). Multiplied by (-1) to make a larger Z-score reflects a higher risk taking. The natural log of 
stock return volatility (LnsStkrtn) from Goetz et al. (2016); default probability (     ̈  ) from Bharath and Shumway 
(2008); and nonperforming loan ratio (NPL/TA) from Berger et al. (2016) are also proxies used for risk taking. All 
other firm characteristics are as defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile. Country and year fixed effects are included in each regression but not reported. The 
models are estimated by difference-in-differences with standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity 
and double clustered at the firm and year level. Statistical significance denoted as ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively (using a two-sided test).
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TABLE 5 (PANEL B)  The effect of SACORD on risk taking (matched sample)
LnσStkrtn LnZ-score(rtn) LnZ-score(roa)        LnNPL/TA
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
EUR*PsSACORD 0.154*** 2.87 0.273** 2.42 0.385*** 2.71 0.227*** 5.39 0.085 0.55
IFRS -0.141*** -2.69 -0.283** -2.43 0.049 0.26 -0.010 -0.36 0.029 0.17
FINCRS 0.446*** 13.09 0.875*** 12.15 0.198** 2.06 0.118*** 4.20 0.197* 1.93
Basel II 0.363*** 6.81 0.725*** 6.37 0.188 1.23 0.068** 2.07 0.148 0.96
LnGeoSegmts 0.063 1.40 0.175* 1.86 -0.052 -0.35 -0.008 -0.20 -0.033 -0.26
Loss_Ind 0.436*** 8.79 0.999*** 9.44 0.704*** 5.85 0.348*** 7.10 0.799*** 6.05
LnAssets -0.037*** -3.77 -0.110*** -4.83 -0.077*** -2.84 0.000 0.01 -0.019 -0.60
LTDebt/TA -0.003 -1.41 -0.012*** -2.93 -0.006 -1.05 -0.001 -0.35 -0.004 -0.55
NLoan/TA -0.003** -2.11 -0.012*** -3.62 -0.012*** -3.27 -0.002 -1.29 0.002 0.43
LnGDPPerCap -2.799*** -4.75 -5.275*** -4.07 -2.329 -1.56 -1.352*** -3.21 1.678 1.05
EconFreedm 0.053*** 5.33 0.097*** 4.34 -0.060* -1.87 -0.002 -0.20 0.003 0.08
Tobin’s Q 0.040*** 6.06 0.325*** 17.56 0.123*** 7.15 0.026*** 5.24 0.044*** 2.44
LnSTDCFO 0.063*** 3.52 0.132*** 3.37 0.243*** 4.58 0.027* 1.73 0.020 0.41
CFO/TA 0.013 1.02 -0.062** -2.05 -0.013 -0.37 0.002 0.23 0.117*** 2.26
NIR/Rev -0.029 -0.20 -0.509* -1.66 -0.604 -1.62 -0.160 -1.18 0.669 1.38
LnAuditCommN -0.026 -1.58 -0.059* -1.72 -0.064 -1.06 -0.009 -0.61 -0.022 -0.44
LnAccruals/TA 0.005 0.46 0.023 0.97 0.071 1.96 -0.001 -0.10 0.048 1.37
Deposit/TA -0.001 -0.89 -0.003 -0.84 -0.008 -1.83 -0.002 -1.42 0.023*** 4.36
LnInst_Investor -0.006 -0.53 -0.019 -0.73 -0.026 -0.84 -0.007 -0.88 0.002 0.06
Debt/GDP 0.010*** 5.49 0.024*** 5.82 -0.003 -0.50 0.004** 2.36 0.036*** 7.01
Intercept 19.126*** 3.09 14.340 1.06 17.977 1.15 12.259 2.75 -26.247 -1.55
No of observations 716 716 717 715 715 
Adj. R-squared 72.31 73.19 36.51 40.65 73.76 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table shows the regression results for the risk taking behaviour of banks post-SACORD. The dependent 
variables are the log value of bank Z-score(rtn) from Goetz et al. (2016); natural log value of bank Z-score(roa) from 
Laeven and Levine (2009). Multiplied by (-1) to make a larger Z-score reflects a higher risk taking. The natural log of 
stock return volatility (LnsStkrtn) from Goetz et al. (2016); default probability (    ̈  ) from Bharath and Shumway 
(2008); and nonperforming loan ratio (NPL/TA) from Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2016) are also proxies used 
for risk taking. All other firm characteristics are as defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentile. Country and year fixed effects are included in each regression but not reported. The 
models are estimated by difference-in-differences with standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and double 
clustered at the firm and year level. Statistical significance denoted as ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively (using a two-sided test). 
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TABLE 6 The effect of SACORD on reporting quality
EU Banks Only   Matched Sample 
Chargeoff(t+1) EBP(t+1) Chargeoff(t+1) EBP(t+1)
1 2 3 4 
(EUR*)PsSACORD 0.113*** 0.335 0.117 0.182 
[2.87] [0.31] [0.88] [0.36] 
LLP/TA -0.019 -0.441*** 
[1.04] [2.95] 
(EUR*)PsSACORD*LLP/TA 0.017** 0.311** 
[2.04] [2.33] 
NPL/TA 0.062*** 0.091* 
[3.70] [1.74] 
ROA -0.151*** -0.123*** 
[3.18] [2.78] 
(EUR*)PsSACORD*ROA 0.208** 0.163** 
[2.53] [2.36] 
LnTA 0.009 -0.081* 0.290*** -0.129 
[0.10] [-1.70] [3.70] [-1.45] 
Intercept -0.204 3.018*** -5.941*** 4.551* 
[-0.11] [3.47] [3.70] [1.81] 
Number of observations 978 1260 732 732 
R-squared (%) 62.57 52.23 61.71 55.59 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents the regression results of EU banks only and matched sample for 
the following models:  ℎ           =    +   [   ] ∗          +      /    +
  [   ] ∗          ∗    /    +    /    +       +    and          =    +
  [   ] ∗          +        +       ∗          ∗      +       +    where 
 ℎ           is loan charge-offs during year t+1 scaled by total assets of year t  and 
       is Pre-tax income before provision for loan loss during year t+1 scaled by total 
assets of year t. PsSACORD is an indicator variable that equals one in the post-SACORD 
period for the EU only sample, EUR*PsSACORD is an indicator variable that equals one 
in the post-SACORD period in the EU for the matched sample, and zero otherwise. *, **, 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All other firm characteristics are as 
defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. 
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TABLE 7A  The effect of SACORD on compliance costs of large and small banks 
EU banks only Matched Sample
LnAuditfees LnTotalfees LnAuditfees LnTotalfees 
1 2 3 4 
PsSACORD/EUR*PsSACORD*
-Large banks 0.125 0.141* 0.189** 0.222*** 
[1.18] [1.76] [2.17] [2.78] 
-Small banks 0.156*** 0.162** 0.219** 0.238** 
[2.84] [2.32] [2.30] [2.48] 
Number of observations 921 921 706 706 
Adj. R-squared (%) 77.23 72.86 82.49 72.66 
Wald tests for differences across coefficients (p-value): 
Large/small banks 0.0002 0.0041 0.0015 0.0050 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the effect of SACORD on audit fees and total fees for larger and smaller banks. 
We classify large banks as banks with total assets above the median value of the sample and 
smaller banks as those with total assets below the sample median value. The dependent variables 
are the Natural logarithm of audit fees and total Fees. In estimating columns (1) and (2), 
PsSACORD is an interaction dummy variable equals to one if the EU bank has implemented 
SACORD from the adoption year to 2013 and zero otherwise. In estimating columns (3) and (4), 
EUR*PsSACORD is an interaction dummy variable equals to one if the bank is EU and the period 
is from the adoption year to 2013. All other firm characteristics are as defined in the Appendix. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Country and year fixed effects 
are included in each regression but not reported. The models are estimated by difference-in-
differences with standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. 
Statistical significance denoted as ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (using a two-
sided test). 
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TABLE 7B  The effect of SACORD on risk taking of large and small banks
LnσStkrtn LnZ-score(rtn) LnZ-score(roa)        LnNPL/TA
1 2 3 4 5 
EU banks only
PsSACORD* 
-Large banks 0.438*** 0.752*** 0.222*** 0.330*** 0.755*** 
[9.81] [7.74] [3.28] [3.01] [5.85] 
-Small banks 0.290*** 0.676*** 0.200** 0.248** 0.145 
[4.97] [4.96] [2.60] [2.33] [0.97] 
Number of observations 1148 1148 1141 1140 951
Adj. R-squared (%) 54.70 74.55 48.53 35.17 45.52 
Wald tests for differences across coefficients (p-value): 
Large/small banks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 
Matched Sample
EUR*PsSACORD* 
-Large banks 0.401*** 0.726*** 0.335** 0.251*** 0.624*** 
[4.99] [4.44] [2.10] [3.53] [3.31] 
-Small banks 0.088 0.198 0.383** 0.237*** 0.059 
[0.88] [0.94] [2.45] [3.40] [0.34] 
Number of observations 715 715 716 714 714 
Adj. R-squared (%) 66.27 78.25 29.99 40.60 42.94 
Wald tests for differences across coefficients (p-value):
Larger/smaller banks 0.0000 0.0000 0.0480 0.0000 0.0018 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the effect of SACORD on risk taking for larger and smaller banks. We classify 
large banks as banks with total assets above the median value of the sample and smaller banks as 
those with total assets below the sample median value. The dependent variables are the log value of 
bank Z-score(rtn) from Goetz et al. (2016); natural log value of bank Z-score(roa) from Laeven and 
Levine (2009). Multiplied by (-1) to make a larger Z-score reflects a higher risk taking. The natural 
log of stock return volatility (LnsStkrtn) from Goetz et al. (2016); default probability (     ̈  ) from 
Bharath and Shumway (2008); and nonperforming loan ratio (NPL/TA) from Berger et al. (2016) are 
also proxies used for risk taking. In estimating columns (1) to (5), PsSACORD is an interaction 
dummy variable equals to one if the EU bank has implemented SACORD from the adoption year to 
2013 and zero otherwise. For the matched sample, in estimating columns (1) to (5), 
EUR*PsSACORD is an interaction dummy variable equals to one if the bank is EU and the period is 
from the adoption year to 2013 All other firm characteristics are as defined in the Appendix. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Country and year fixed effects are 
included in each regression but not reported. The models are estimated by difference-in-differences 
with standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and double-clustered at the firm and year 
level. Statistical significance denoted as ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (using a 
two-sided test). 
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TABLE 7C  The effect of SACORD on reporting quality of large and small banks  
EU banks only Matched Sample
Chargeoff(t+1) EBP(t+1) Chargeoff(t+1) EBP(t+1)
1 2 3 4 
PsSACORD/EUR*PsSACORD*
- LLP/TA (Large banks) 0.019** 0.269*** 
[2.21] [2.13] 
- LLP/TA (Small banks) 0.013** 0.271** 
[2.04] [2.23] 
PsSACORD/EUR*PsSACORD*
- ROA (Large banks) 0.196** 0.136** 
[2.09] [2.06] 
- ROA (Small banks) 0.199** 0.145** 
[2.11] [2.13] 
Number of observations 978 1260 732 732 
Adj. R-squared (%) 59.27 51.36 61.25 53.61 
Wald tests for differences across coefficients (p-value): 
Large/small banks 0.0015 0.1251 0.1192 0.0006 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the effect of SACORD on loan charge-offs ( ℎ          ) and Pre-tax 
income before provision for loan loss (      ) during year t+1 scaled by total assets of year 
t for larger and smaller banks. We classify large banks as banks with total assets above the median 
value of the sample. In estimating (1) and (2), PsSACORD is an interaction dummy variable equals to 
one if the EU bank has implemented SACORD from the adoption year to 2013 and zero otherwise. In 
estimating (3) and (4), EUR*PsSACORD is an interaction dummy variable equals to one if the bank 
is EU and the period is from the adoption year to 2013. All other firm characteristics are as defined in 
the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Country and 
year fixed effects are included in each regression but not reported. The models are estimated by 
difference-in-differences with standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and double-
clustered at the firm and year level. Statistical significance denoted as ***, **, and * for 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively (using a two-sided test). 
